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CONDITIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
FELIX B. CHANG †

The burgeoning field of Critical Romani Studies explores the
persistent subjugation of Europe’s largest minority, the Roma. Within
this field, it has become fashionable to draw parallels to the U.S. Civil
Rights Movement. 1 Yet the comparisons are often one-sided; lessons
tend to flow from Civil Rights to Roma Rights more than the other
way around. It is an all-too-common hagiography of Civil Rights,
where our history becomes a blueprint for other movements for racial
equality.
To correct this trend, this Essay reveals what American
scholars can learn from Roma Rights. Specifically, this Essay argues
that the European Union’s Roma integration policies illuminate a
relatively unexplored dynamic of America’s post-Civil War
Reconstruction: the influence of the Reconstruction Act of 1867 upon
the Fifteenth Amendment. The Reconstruction Act imposed
conditions upon the readmission of former Confederate states that
were out of step with laws governing incumbent states within the
Union. Most prominently, Southern states had to uphold the suffrage
rights of freedmen, even though Northern states denied AfricanAmericans the vote at almost every opportunity. Similarly, when the
European Union (“EU”) expanded into post-Communist Eastern
Europe, the Union required that accession candidates adopt minority
†
Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. E-mail:
felix.chang@uc.edu. I thank Rebecca Zietlow and Chris Bryant for their insightful
comments. This article benefitted from presentations at Central European
University, Duke, University of Wisconsin, and University of Toledo.
1

See, e.g., James A. Goldston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Educational
Opportunity in the United States and Europe: From Brown v. Board to D.H. and
Beyond, in REALIZING ROMA RIGHTS (Jacqueline Bhabha et al. eds., 2017).
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protections that were stricter than the obligations of incumbent
members.
This Essay begins by framing the readmission of exConfederate states as conditionality, the process of negotiation over
conditions for membership. Conditionality is closely associated with
the eastern enlargement of the EU, another federal system that
demanded more of candidates than of members. At times, the
conditions for readmission and accession elevated the racial equality
standards for all states. The U.S. appeared to pass the Fifteenth
Amendment, for example, which guarantees the vote to all male
citizens, to put to rest the uneven imposition of suffrage. 2 Similarly,
the EU incorporated “respect for minorities” into its constitutional
order in response to charges of hypocrisy. The conditionality
framework therefore shows how the internal and external competences
of a federal government can influence one another, illuminating
whether bold demands upon candidates can lift up the standards for all
member states.
However, Reconstruction failed so spectacularly that a
“Second Reconstruction,” as the Civil Rights Movement is sometimes
known, was needed to give full effect to the meaning of freedom. This
Essay concludes by showing how the incongruence between
readmission conditions and the constitutional framework undermined
the Reconstruction Amendments. While some scholars have explored
the influence of the Northwest Ordinance on the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 3 none have ever cast this relationship
between the U.S. federal government’s internal and external
governance as conditionality, that concept which has come to embody
the challenge of sustaining reforms once an applicant becomes a fullfledged member. 4

2

See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 74–75 (2000).
3
E.g., Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of
Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119
(2004); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2008).
4
Professor Ackerman has noted the dearth of legal scholarship on the effect of the
Reconstruction Act upon the Fourteenth Amendment, though he has not analyzed
this dynamic as the influence of external conditions on internal governance. See
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 190 (1998).
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CONDITIONALITY DURING EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND
AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION

Like any other club, a federalist system can require conditions
for membership. 5 Each round that the EU negotiated to bring in a
prospective member, the Union imposed terms for accession. The
framework for accession lies in Article 49 TEU, a short provision that,
prior to the fifth enlargement, began, “Any European State which
respects the values referred to in [ex] Article 6 and is committed to
promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” 6
Because the understanding of the fundamental rights referenced in
Article 6, now renumbered as Article 2, is constantly changing, no two
rounds of accession are ever the same. 7
During the fifth enlargement (1993-2004), candidate countries
had to abide by a set of conditions devised by the European Council
during a 1993 meeting. These conditions encompassed the criteria of
“guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities.” 8 While the other criteria had
appeared in prior rounds of enlargement, the insertion of minority
protections in the fifth enlargement was entirely new. 9 And yet,
because application for membership in any club is beset by power
dynamics, the candidates from Central and Southeast Europe
(“CSEE”) had little choice but to acquiesce—even if accession criteria
were more exacting than the rules binding current members. For Roma
rights, the eastern enlargements of 2004, 2007, and 2013 have been
especially consequential; these rounds marked the first time that the
EU was willing to use accession conditions to pressure states on Roma
policies.
Within the Union, however, the EU did not hold its thencurrent members to the same level of scrutiny. Members with sizeable
Romani populations or thorny minority issues did not draw
comparable condemnation for treating their minorities badly. In the
end, of course, the power disparity between the EU and CSEE
5

Karen E. Smith, The Evolution and Application of EU Membership
Conditionality, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 106 (Marise
Cremona ed., 2003).
6
TEU art. 6 (as in effect 1993) (now TEU art. 2).
7
DIMITRY KOCHENOV, EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF CONDITIONALITY:
PRE-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY IN THE FIELDS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF
LAW 11 (2007).
8
See European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council—
21-22 June 1993 (1993).
9
Marc Maresceau, Pre-accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 13 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003).
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accession candidates required those candidates to accept minority
protections under the Copenhagen criteria.
The U.S., too, imposed requirements upon candidates for
statehood whenever a new state was inducted. For racial equality, the
most important developments came not during admission of any
territory as a state, but during the readmission of former Confederate
states back into the Union after the Civil War. Two of the landmarks
of racial equality from this era were the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth
Amendments. Yet federal advocacy of racial equality was not limited
to Constitutional amendments. During Reconstruction, Congress also
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which defined citizenship and its
attendant equal protection rights; 10 three separate Reconstruction
Acts, which divided the South into districts administered by the U.S.
military and imposed conditions upon the readmission of states
formerly in rebellion; 11 the Enforcement Act 1871, which allowed the
President to use force to suppress the Ku Klux Klan; 12 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which ensured equal treatment in public
accommodations. 13
From roughly 1865 to 1870, much of the above legislation
framed the Union’s conditions for the readmission of Southern states
and the seating of their representatives. The Reconstruction Act of
1867, in particular, required that Southern states ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14 Further, the seating of each Southern state’s
representatives was governed by a separate act of Congress; these acts
provided for varying degrees of protection of African-American
suffrage. 15 All of these terms comprised the conditionality of Southern
readmission and representation.
When the conditionalities of EU accession and American
Reconstruction are compared, several patterns emerge.
First it was the top rung of the federalist system—the EU and
the U.S. federal government—that ushered in the reforms of minority
rights and racial equality. The 1990s and early 2000s saw the EU
growing more comfortable with fundamental rights. In the U.S.,
Reconstruction marks the most significant turning point in the nation’s
federal–state relations, especially in the sphere of racial equality. The
succession of Constitutional amendments and federal civil rights
legislation was buttressed (if sporadically) by enforcement measures

10

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27–30 (1866).
First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
12
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
13
18 Stat. 335–337 (repealed in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
14
ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 199–201.
15
Biber, supra note 3, at 143–44.
11
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such as the dispatching of federal troops to quell racial violence in the
South and the creation of the Freedman’s Bureau to administer the
post-emancipation transition. These innovations were consistent with
the defining strategy of EU constitutionalization and Radical
Republican lawmaking: confer the federal entity jurisdiction and
enforcement authority by defining certain actions against minority
groups as infractions of federal law.
The second pattern emerging from the Reconstruction
comparison is that the conditions required of aspiring members were
far more rigorous than the constraints placed upon incumbent
members. This incongruity is related to the first pattern; for the
consolidation of power at the federal level gave each union the
wherewithal to foist bold demands on aspiring members. Hence, the
EU required minority rights of the East which were being flouted in
the West. This disjunction became most prominent in 2010, during
France’s expulsion of Romani populations “back” to Bulgaria and
Romania, two states that had recently joined the Union.
Hypocrisy was manifest in the conditions for the readmission
of the Southern states and the seating of their representatives in
Congress. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 began by reciting that “no
legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property
now exists in the rebel States of Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida.” 16 It
then divided the “rebel States” into five military districts, where
commanders could deploy a military force to “suppress insurrection,
disorder, and violence.” 17 Rancor toward the Confederacy permeated
the Act, which reaffirmed the disenfranchisement of Confederate
soldiers and required senators and representatives to take a loyalty
oath to the Union—punitive measures that had been circulating in
Congressional bills for years. 18 The denial of suffrage to participants
in rebellion stood in stark contrast to the expansion of voting rights for
African-American men. Finally, the Reconstruction Act of 1867
mandated ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, passed by
Congress the prior year. Clearly, none of these stipulations applied to
the Northern states.
Third, the comparison of conditionalities teaches that charges
of hypocrisy may eventually prompt harmonization of internal and

16

Ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
Id. §§ 1–3.
18
See, e.g., id. § 5. Disenfranchisement was also provided in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See also MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863, 214–16
(1974) [hereinafter LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE].
17
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external governance—specifically, by raising the standards of
minority protection within the federalist system. In the U.S., the
clearest example is the expansion of voting rights. African-American
suffrage had long been a point of contention in Congress, where
Radical Republicans sparred with conservative Republicans over how
to give full effect to the liberty of emancipated slaves. Yet Congress
did manage to pass the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which defended
the ability of African-Americans in Southern states to vote. For the
next three years, the South had to submit to federal baselines for
elections even though Northern states were free to disenfranchise
African-Americans. All the while, pressure mounted for a federal
solution to take care of the disparity once and for all—a solution that,
as Radicals and moderates converged, took the form of a
Constitutional amendment. It took some time and much political
wrangling for this effort to take off, but eventually Congress drafted—
and in 1870 the requisite number of states ratified—the Fifteenth
Amendment to guarantee universal suffrage.
As for the EU, the double standards between internal and
external governance ultimately propelled the adoption of a Unionwide Charter of Fundamental Rights. Commentators observed that
minority protections were more onerous under pre-accession
documents than under EU treaties. 19 One episode did more than
anything else to catalyze reform of this discrepancy: Austria’s election
of Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party to a governing coalition in
1999. 20 Here was a bout of xenophobia in an incumbent member state
that challenged the EU’s projection of itself as a defender minority
protections. In response to the Haider affair, the EU commissioned a
report on the Austrian impasse that recommended three major changes
which were ultimately adopted: a change to Article 7 TEU to suspend
certain rights if a member engaged in a “series and persistent” breach
of fundamental rights; the creation of a new human rights agency; and
incorporation of a “bill of rights” into the EU treaties. 21 The Charter
of Fundamental Rights was drafted as a response to the third charge.
Though the Charter does not expressly address minority rights, it was
given effect by the Lisbon Treaty, which added “rights of persons
belonging to minorities” to the EU’s list of founding values. 22 Finally,

19

See, e.g., Editorial, Fundamental Rights and EU Membership: Do As I Say, Not
As I Do!, 499 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 481, 487 (2012).
20
See Michael Merlingen et al., The Right and the Righteous? European Norms,
Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria, 39 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
59 (2001).
21
See id. at 697–99.
22
See TEU art. 2.
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it seemed, the time had come to shore up minority protections within
EU law.
II.

THE DILUTION OF CONDITIONALITY

So far, the Roma Rights–Reconstruction comparison has
suggested that when a federalist system imposes staunch minority
protections upon prospective members, comparable protections within
the system’s member states can improve over time. Yet the
harmonization of conditionality and internal governance is not so
straightforward, if it happens at all. Sometimes the laws governing
incumbent members weigh conditionality down; other times, internal
and external laws meet somewhere in the middle.
During Reconstruction and the fifth enlargement, both unions
quickly squandered their advantages over aspiring members. Each did
so in its own way: the EU misspent the better part of the 1990s through
inconsistency and ambiguity, while infighting sapped the momentum
of Reconstruction despite the tail wind of victory from the Civil War.
In 1993, the European Council presented accession candidates with a
nebulous mandate of minority protection, which the European
Commission enforced unevenly. In its 1998 report on Slovakia, for
example, the Commission noted that Roma suffered discrimination,
harassment, and lack of police protection; the report then lauded the
government for approving a “Plan for Solving Romany Problems,”
before concluding without further analysis that the program has been
criticized for lack of funding and commitment. 23 Similarly in 1999,
the Commission remarked that Roma in the Czech Republic continued
to suffer discrimination, prejudice, and lack of police and judicial
protection; meanwhile, the government had adopted some helpful
policies and laws, but those measures too were underfunded,
understaffed, and ineffective. 24 Overall, the Commission had no clear
formulation of what integration looked like—no guidelines to aspire
toward and no benchmarks to measures progress. 25
If the Commission was inconsistent in its approach, it could at
least lead the way on conditionality. During Reconstruction, stark
divisions split the Presidency—and frequently Congress itself. Shortly
after Andrew Johnson assumed the Presidency, he became a co-

23

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON CZECH
REPUBLIC’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 12 (1998).
24
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON CZECH
REPUBLIC’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 16–17 (1999);
25
See PETER VERMEERSCH, THE ROMANI MOVEMENT: MINORITY POLITICS &
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL EUROPE 198-99 (2006).
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conspirator of the recalcitrant South, extending leniency at every turn
and eventually campaigning as the bulwark against Radical
Reconstruction. 26 Betrayed, the progressive faction of the Republican
Party assumed control over Reconstruction, shepherding virtually all
of the legislation identified with the era, often over Johnson’s vetoes.
As the threat of war receded, Congress assumed control of the
procedure for admission. This does not mean Congress was unified in
its approach to Reconstruction; for deep schisms also cut across the
legislative body. Because Radicals and Democrats were bitter
antagonists, conservative Republicans played an outsized role in
legislation. To cajole conservatives into breaking impasses, Radicals
had to compromise, and so the Reconstruction Amendments almost
have to be narrowly construed. 27 This means that the Thirteenth
Amendment might have done no more than simply abolished slavery,
without granting any additional rights; 28 that the Fourteenth
Amendment, as originally conceived, might only have endorsed a few
basic liberties, rather than broadly prohibiting racial discrimination
outright; 29 and that the Fifteenth Amendment might have required
only the racially neutral application of voting laws, regardless of
disparate impacts. 30 The shortcomings of each amendment
necessitated a subsequent amendment—and eventually the Civil
Rights Movement.
Thus, laws on racial equality within the Union never matched
the vigor of demands placed upon territories outside the Union. Even
if the Reconstruction Act provided a paragon for suffrage, by spelling
out the voting restrictions that would be prohibited and the voting
expansions that would be encouraged, when it came time for the
template to be extended to the entire Union, Congress settled on the
Fifteenth Amendment, whose final language was watered down from
the initial proposals. 31 The Fifteenth Amendment would foment the
ire of women suffragists, tolerate Chinese voting prohibitions in the
West, and confer states the freedom to regulate the “privilege” of
voting as they saw fit. 32 The poll taxes, literacy tests, and other voting
26

See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE,
LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901, 16–17 (2001).
27
See LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 18, at 222, 325–
35.
28
EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–
1869, 27–28 (1990).
29
Id. at 96.
30
Id. at 156.
31
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, 446 (1988).
32
See id. at 447-49.
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restrictions that sprang up would endure for nearly a century until the
federal government definitively intervened again with the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.
Nor were new EU members from CSEE on equal footing with
incumbents in Western and Northern Europe. Despite attaining
accession in the sixth enlargement in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania
could not join the Schengen zone of visa-free travel within the EU.
One of the principal reasons was the fear of influxes of Romani
migrants. 33
The conditionalities of the U.S. and EU also resembled each
other how the lofty aspirations of external standards fell prey to
dissension, sabotage, and lack of conviction. For instance, the Charter
of Fundamental Rights, which the EU championed in part as redress
for conditionality’s incongruence, was slow to take effect and rather
unsatisfactory when it did. The drafters managed to complete the
Charter quickly, within a year of the Haider affair. Yet because its
status was intertwined with the Union’s contemporaneous project to
adopt a Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty’s inability to secure
ratification cast the status of the Charter into doubt for nearly a
decade. 34 The Charter only entered into force with the Lisbon Treaty
in 2009. Even then, the Charter did not address minority rights. 35
These results are to be expected, with conditionality pursued
only halfheartedly and the “bar” for minority rights inside the Unions
only half-raised. After all, the coalitions that adopted these reforms
were disparate, and the convergences of interests that held them
together were narrow and temporary. 36 Minority protections under
conditionality were spurred by the EU’s desire to stabilize its Eastern
front and, later, to stem the flow of Romani refugees into Western
Europe and Canada. Once the candidate countries joined, they would
be subject to the same Treaty obligations as other members; hence,
even if Western Europe wanted to contain refugee movement, the
ability to do so was more limited. 37
In the U.S., the conditions imposed upon the reconstructed
South derived from several interests: to punish the Confederacy, 38 to
33

Tony Todd, France Opposes Border-Free Travel for Romania, Bulgaria,
FRANCE24, Sept. 30, 2013.
34
See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 393 (5th ed. 2011).
35
Id. at 395.
36 See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
37
EU citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence within the Union. TFEU
arts. 20–21.
38
FONER, supra note 31, at 254.
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secure Republican votes, 39 to limit the movement of AfricanAmericans into the North, 40 and to guarantee rights for emancipated
slaves. 41 These concerns were thought to be resolved by the
Fourteenth Amendment, which barred Confederates from political
office and threatened to shrink Congressional representation in the
event of voter suppression, and the various Reconstruction acts, which
conditioned readmission on ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
and set standards for the treatment of African-Americans. To further
shore up loyal Republican votes, Congress passed the Fifteenth
Amendment, expanding suffrage to African-Americans. 42 By then, the
hypocrisy of civil rights was becoming moot—over half the former
Confederate states had been admitted by 1869, and the rest would soon
follow. Civil rights could never command Republican attention for
long; it alienated white voters and split the Republican coalition. 43
With the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, a fractious and tired
Republican Party heralded it as a panacea that was to solve the race
problem at last. 44
Evaluated from the perspective of institutional enforcers,
conditionality led to unexpected results. The U.S. had federal troops
at its disposal, while the EU could only punish transgressions by
withholding, or threatening to withhold, Union membership, technical
assistance, and funds through programs such as PHARE. 45 The fact that
CSEE adopted the acquis and internalized its norms more readily than
the American South did federal laws and norms signals a willingness
on the part of CSEE to join the EU and espouse its vision of Europe.
The CSEE accession candidates were often led by dissidents from the
Communist era who were keen to join the EU “club” and adopt all the
liberal values it represented; the Southern states were merely
vanquished rebels. Truly, EU accession candidates were supplicants
and the ex-Confederate states only malcontents. This willingness on
the part of applicants could overcome even dysfunction in the central
government to usher in something as unpopular as minority rights.
If conditionality can succeed on the enthusiasm of applicants,
then it can fail from their recalcitrance. During Reconstruction, racial
equality faced resistance from white Southerners, though the
difference was in degree. In response to the gains of African39

Biber, supra note 3, at 146.
WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: 1869–1879, 372 (1979).
41
FONER, supra note 31, at 256–59.
42
See RICHARDSON, supra note 26, at 42.
43
See Michael Les Benedict, The Rout of Radicalism: Republicans and the
Elections of 1867, 18 CIV. WAR HIS. 334 (1972).
44
See LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 18, at 335–36.
45
See Maresceau, supra note 9, at 35–36.
40
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Americans, whites joined the Klan and other white supremacy groups,
terrorizing African-Americans and occasionally their Republican
allies. Today, historians attribute the failure of Reconstruction largely
to the violence inflicted by white Southerners upon their neighbors.46
Violence, terror, and exclusion against Romani neighbors also plagued
CSEE countries when they were accession candidates. Police and
vigilantes alike killed Roma and burned their homes, while cities built
walls around Romani neighborhoods–not to mention all the manners
in which Roma were excluded from participation and representation
in society. Persecution was severe enough to cause Roma to flee into
Western Europe and North America to seek asylum. 47 Yet until the
recent crises engulfing Europe, anti-Romanyism generally did not
translate into organized campaigns or the platforms of major political
parties. 48 In the American South, persecution of African-Americans
was the way of life under the prior social order; when Reconstruction
threatened to upend that order, whites resorted to fraud, sabotage,
violence, and downright insurrection to restore it.
By itself, the majoritarian impulse to attack minority rights
does not necessarily doom progress on equality. It is against the
backdrop of disorganized and lackluster federal (or, in the EU’s case,
supranational) leadership that local resistance prevails. The
determination of member state governments plays an important role
as well. Here the distinction between CSEE and the American South
was not in degree but in kind. In 1865, none of the newly reconstituted
Southern state governments reflected popular will, if “popular” be
measured by the desires of all citizens within the state. In CSEE,
national governments were cut from an entirely different cloth. They
legitimately represented their citizens, some political leaders having
braved incarceration under Communism. These leaders did speak for
the populace, reflect liberal democratic values, and, even if Romani
rights were unpopular, side philosophically with human rights. They
would stand in stark contrast to the governors and lawmakers who
succeeded the initial batch of Unionists ensconced by Lincoln and
Johnson; many of these successors had fought for the Confederacy.
Where CSEE nations in the 1990s were led by artists and dissidents,
Southern states in the 1870s and onward would be led by
Confederates, Democrats, and segregationists.

46

See DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF,
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 19 (2014).
47
See Sean Rehaag et al., No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in
Canada (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2588058.
48
But see Matthew Rhodes, Slovakia after Mečiar, 48 PROB. POST-COMMUNISM 3
(2001).
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CONCLUSION

The evolution of Roma Rights teaches that conditionality can
be an agent of a federalist system’s constitutional change. At times,
the disparity in how applicants versus incumbents are treated spurs the
system to raise the bar for incumbents (thereby lifting the floor); other
times, this disparity weakens the ambitious mandates placed upon the
applicants (thereby lowering the ceiling). For the U.S. during
Reconstruction, the second pattern is more apt. The Union confused
reconstruction with reconciliation too frequently. 49 It would take a
century and new, external threats for the federal government to move
past the specter of reconciliation and demand minority protections
with the same vigor exhibited by the EU toward CSEE states.

49

MICHAEL PERMAN, REUNION WITHOUT COMPROMISE: THE SOUTH AND
RECONSTRUCTION 1856–1868, 7 (1973).

